September - October 2010: Asian Conflicts Report
An analysis of the Naxal movement reveals a shift in their style of violence since November 2005, when about 1,000 Naxalites stormed the police lines around the Jehanabad district prison, Bihar, in a bid to free their jailed comrades. Called "Operation Jail Break", the action resulted in the escape of over 375 prisoners, including 130 Naxal cadres, and the death of eleven policemen in the ensuing gun battle. The precursor to this attack was the September 2004 merger of two militant Naxalite factions, the People‟s War Group (Communist Party of India – Marxist-Leninist) and the Maoist Communist Centre (India), to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist).
Following these developments, violence has escalated over large parts of India, and the trend in Naxal violence has changed. Kanu Sanyal, founding leader of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), admitted in 2007 that the Naxal movement has lost touch with its original motives, and deviated from its path to become a terrorist group. Most of the older generation of Naxalites abhor the large-scale violence that the Naxals are unleashing at present.
Originally, the main objective of Naxal violence was to seize power through an agrarian revolution, in order to then replace the existing feudal system through land reform. Now, however, their demands have deviated to encompass a general revolution and the overthrow of the existing political system and establish a parallel apparatus of governance. A severing of links with the Nepalese Maoists has accompanied this change. The Indian Maoists criticized the Nepalese Maoists, led by Prachanda, for ending the revolution and incarcerating their People‟s Liberation Army (PLA) in UN-supervised barracks, as part of their adoption of the parliamentary path. The criticism from the Indian Maoists intensified after Prachanda‟s 2009 victory in Nepal‟s general elections.
The Naxals have also shifted from being an agrarian revolution to expanding their reach to the far ends of the forested tribal corridor along the east-central heartland of India (the "Red Corridor"). This shift has resulted in the inclusion of tribal and forest rights in the Naxal agenda. Mining activities, the setting up of new industries and the building of infrastructure in these areas has resulted in the large-scale displacement of the local tribal populations. There have been no proper rehabilitation measures put in place by the government to accompany this development. This has created a trust deficit in the area and, finding that the Naxal cadres sympathize with their loss of homes and exploitation, the tribals have sided with them against the government. The Naxals are also using female cadres and young girls in their attacks. However, the Naxal leadership has yet to include any prominent females.
There has been a spurt in violence against security personnel, including state police and central paramilitary forces (CPMF). Naxals have started ambushing police parties in transit and looting their weapons. This is the Naxals‟ primary source of arms. In 2008, 45 security personnel were killed, in 2009 the number significantly increased to 312. So far, this year, the number stands at 227.
The government has substantially increased its deployment of security personnel in Naxal-affected areas, and this has probably contributed to the increase in casualties. Also, questions have been raised about the training and preparedness of security forces who, critics feel, are slack in following standard counter-insurgency operating procedures.
Of late, a pattern of coordinated simultaneous Naxal attacks on newly deployed security reinforcements has emerged. Police lines have come under attack concurrently with wider attacks against infrastructure. According to Central Reserve Police Forces (CRPF) estimates, there are between 10-15,000 armed Naxalites, in comparison to 60,000 security personnel, in the Red Corridor. However, guerrilla tactics of targeting and ambushing in hit-and-run operations are successfully employed by the Naxals.
In its embryonic stages, the Naxal movement was primarily village-based, and distanced from centers of government power. However, the Red Corridor has seen a significant expansion over the last few years, especially in the resource-rich eastern tribal parts of the country. This has led the Union government to take a more serious view of the situation, and precipitated an unprecedented level of connection between the government and rural and tribal areas.
The states most affected by Naxal violence, West Bengal, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra, account for about 85% of the total coal reserves of the country. There are also rich mineral reserves in almost all of these affected states. This has allowed the Naxals to wield influence over the country‟s economic growth prospects, thus escalating the Naxal problem to one of national significance.
Moreover, Naxal activities, which were earlier confined to rural and forested areas, are now being initiated in urban areas also. Top Naxal leaders, including Kobad Gandhy, who was arrested in New Delhi last year, have been making attempts to garner support and funds from urban laborers, students, human rights activists, social workers and sympathizers. This has led to an increase in public interest on the issue. In 2008, armed Naxals targeted two towns in Orissa. They have also warned of carrying out future coordinated urban attacks, but their capability to do so remains in doubt. Spurts of Naxal activity and efforts for garnering support in urban India are indicative of future problems.
When the Naxal movement started, axes and sickles were the primary weapons used to attack government machinery. In recent times, however the Naxals have started using sophisticated weapons technology along with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The use of IEDs in the Red Corridor has increased in the recent years by 50%. In addition, Naxal cadres are being given extensive weapons and explosive handling training. Some of the CDs recovered during anti-Naxal operations in Andhra Pradesh show a near military like training for the cadres.
The CPMF have limited capability to detect and disengage IEDs, and the Naxal cadres capitalize on this. The escalation of violence in these areas is partly a result of a sharp increase in the number of arms available to the Naxals. In 2009 the Naxals used rocket launchers, and are now reportedly in the process of developing remote controlled-IEDs, as opposed to their traditional manual ones. Security agencies and local police have indicated the presence of at least two factories making IEDs, small bombs and mortar shells by reusing gelatin sticks, which are sourced from mining areas in the dense forests along the foothills of Jharkhand and Chhatisgarh. The Naxals are also using Claymore Mines which don‟t need to be buried underground but can be fitted to a tree to cause intensive damage. There have been reports of Naxals using weapons smuggled from outside of the Red Corridor.
Unlike in the past when each state had its own anti-Naxal policy, the present trend indicates efforts to formulate a consolidated unitary strategy against the Naxal menace. This is evident in the recent move by the Federal Government to set up a unified anti-Naxal command for operations over the four worst affected Naxal states (Chhattisgarh, Orissa, West Bengal and Jharkhand). The government has also created state and central level intelligence sharing mechanisms to ensure the smooth flow of intelligence inputs among the states and between them and the center.
In 2009, the Indian government launched Operation Green Hunt, which deployed over 50,000 CPMF personnel in the worst Naxal affected regions. In 2005, the Salwa Judum emerged, a popular anti-Naxal movement led by the people of Chhattisgarh, and this was later adopted by the government, who has been funding and training Special Police Officers (SPO) under it ever since. This year, in addition to strengthening local police stations, the government has sanctioned 34 additional battalions of central forces and 16,000 additional SPOs to be deployed in these areas.
In terms of development, the Road Transport and Highways Ministry has sanctioned funds to improve road connectivity in the 34 worst affected districts, at a cost of US$9.5 million. The government is also investing heavily in the National Rural Health Mission, rural electrification, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (education for all), the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and the distribution of supplementary nutrition and forest rights at the central level. In a report by the Planning Commission in April 2010, government has approved a total of Rs 16,251.6 crore (US$162.5 billion) for development tasks in the Red Corridor. However, to implement these schemes, the government has to first come up with an anti-corruption strategy to ensure that the funds allocated reach their targets.
While the government is aiming at a comprehensive Naxal strategy, there are impediments in the form of resistance by the locals and systemic corruption within the local political establishment. Based on the recent trends, it is clear that the Naxalites are looking to intensify their activities. It is now up to the government to devise a unique counterstrategy based on the appeasement of socioeconomic concerns. This will be vital if India wants to put an end to this growing menace for good.
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