Saturday, December 25, 2010
Searching for Peace: India: Soft Hard or Sneaky
Searching for Peace: India: Soft Hard or Sneaky: "12 August 2010 There is no uniform ‘one-size-fits-all’ kind of a policy which can be applied to India. Therefore, the question about India ..."
Searching for Peace: Trying Times for the CPMFs in the Red Corridor
Searching for Peace: Trying Times for the CPMFs in the Red Corridor: "16 August 2010 The Indian security forces suffered 282 casualties in counter-insurgency operations so far this year, of which, 212 were in ..."
Searching for Peace: Fighting the Naxalites: CRPF is not the Best Optio...
Searching for Peace: Fighting the Naxalites: CRPF is not the Best Optio...: "17 August 2010 “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but ..."
Searching for Peace: Right Information by Right to Information: An Inte...
Searching for Peace: Right Information by Right to Information: An Inte...: "4 October 2010 As India grapples with the Naxal menace in Left Wing Extremism affected states with no concrete long-term solution in sight ..."
Searching for Peace: Recent Trends in Naxal Violence
Searching for Peace: Recent Trends in Naxal Violence: "September - October 2010: Asian Conflicts Report An analysis of the Naxal movement reveals a shift in their style of violence since N..."
Monday, November 22, 2010
Recent Trends in Naxal Violence
September - October 2010: Asian Conflicts Report
An analysis of the Naxal movement reveals a shift in their style of violence since November 2005, when about 1,000 Naxalites stormed the police lines around the Jehanabad district prison, Bihar, in a bid to free their jailed comrades. Called "Operation Jail Break", the action resulted in the escape of over 375 prisoners, including 130 Naxal cadres, and the death of eleven policemen in the ensuing gun battle. The precursor to this attack was the September 2004 merger of two militant Naxalite factions, the People‟s War Group (Communist Party of India – Marxist-Leninist) and the Maoist Communist Centre (India), to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist).
Following these developments, violence has escalated over large parts of India, and the trend in Naxal violence has changed. Kanu Sanyal, founding leader of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), admitted in 2007 that the Naxal movement has lost touch with its original motives, and deviated from its path to become a terrorist group. Most of the older generation of Naxalites abhor the large-scale violence that the Naxals are unleashing at present.
Originally, the main objective of Naxal violence was to seize power through an agrarian revolution, in order to then replace the existing feudal system through land reform. Now, however, their demands have deviated to encompass a general revolution and the overthrow of the existing political system and establish a parallel apparatus of governance. A severing of links with the Nepalese Maoists has accompanied this change. The Indian Maoists criticized the Nepalese Maoists, led by Prachanda, for ending the revolution and incarcerating their People‟s Liberation Army (PLA) in UN-supervised barracks, as part of their adoption of the parliamentary path. The criticism from the Indian Maoists intensified after Prachanda‟s 2009 victory in Nepal‟s general elections.
The Naxals have also shifted from being an agrarian revolution to expanding their reach to the far ends of the forested tribal corridor along the east-central heartland of India (the "Red Corridor"). This shift has resulted in the inclusion of tribal and forest rights in the Naxal agenda. Mining activities, the setting up of new industries and the building of infrastructure in these areas has resulted in the large-scale displacement of the local tribal populations. There have been no proper rehabilitation measures put in place by the government to accompany this development. This has created a trust deficit in the area and, finding that the Naxal cadres sympathize with their loss of homes and exploitation, the tribals have sided with them against the government. The Naxals are also using female cadres and young girls in their attacks. However, the Naxal leadership has yet to include any prominent females.
There has been a spurt in violence against security personnel, including state police and central paramilitary forces (CPMF). Naxals have started ambushing police parties in transit and looting their weapons. This is the Naxals‟ primary source of arms. In 2008, 45 security personnel were killed, in 2009 the number significantly increased to 312. So far, this year, the number stands at 227.
The government has substantially increased its deployment of security personnel in Naxal-affected areas, and this has probably contributed to the increase in casualties. Also, questions have been raised about the training and preparedness of security forces who, critics feel, are slack in following standard counter-insurgency operating procedures.
Of late, a pattern of coordinated simultaneous Naxal attacks on newly deployed security reinforcements has emerged. Police lines have come under attack concurrently with wider attacks against infrastructure. According to Central Reserve Police Forces (CRPF) estimates, there are between 10-15,000 armed Naxalites, in comparison to 60,000 security personnel, in the Red Corridor. However, guerrilla tactics of targeting and ambushing in hit-and-run operations are successfully employed by the Naxals.
In its embryonic stages, the Naxal movement was primarily village-based, and distanced from centers of government power. However, the Red Corridor has seen a significant expansion over the last few years, especially in the resource-rich eastern tribal parts of the country. This has led the Union government to take a more serious view of the situation, and precipitated an unprecedented level of connection between the government and rural and tribal areas.
The states most affected by Naxal violence, West Bengal, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra, account for about 85% of the total coal reserves of the country. There are also rich mineral reserves in almost all of these affected states. This has allowed the Naxals to wield influence over the country‟s economic growth prospects, thus escalating the Naxal problem to one of national significance.
Moreover, Naxal activities, which were earlier confined to rural and forested areas, are now being initiated in urban areas also. Top Naxal leaders, including Kobad Gandhy, who was arrested in New Delhi last year, have been making attempts to garner support and funds from urban laborers, students, human rights activists, social workers and sympathizers. This has led to an increase in public interest on the issue. In 2008, armed Naxals targeted two towns in Orissa. They have also warned of carrying out future coordinated urban attacks, but their capability to do so remains in doubt. Spurts of Naxal activity and efforts for garnering support in urban India are indicative of future problems.
When the Naxal movement started, axes and sickles were the primary weapons used to attack government machinery. In recent times, however the Naxals have started using sophisticated weapons technology along with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The use of IEDs in the Red Corridor has increased in the recent years by 50%. In addition, Naxal cadres are being given extensive weapons and explosive handling training. Some of the CDs recovered during anti-Naxal operations in Andhra Pradesh show a near military like training for the cadres.
The CPMF have limited capability to detect and disengage IEDs, and the Naxal cadres capitalize on this. The escalation of violence in these areas is partly a result of a sharp increase in the number of arms available to the Naxals. In 2009 the Naxals used rocket launchers, and are now reportedly in the process of developing remote controlled-IEDs, as opposed to their traditional manual ones. Security agencies and local police have indicated the presence of at least two factories making IEDs, small bombs and mortar shells by reusing gelatin sticks, which are sourced from mining areas in the dense forests along the foothills of Jharkhand and Chhatisgarh. The Naxals are also using Claymore Mines which don‟t need to be buried underground but can be fitted to a tree to cause intensive damage. There have been reports of Naxals using weapons smuggled from outside of the Red Corridor.
Unlike in the past when each state had its own anti-Naxal policy, the present trend indicates efforts to formulate a consolidated unitary strategy against the Naxal menace. This is evident in the recent move by the Federal Government to set up a unified anti-Naxal command for operations over the four worst affected Naxal states (Chhattisgarh, Orissa, West Bengal and Jharkhand). The government has also created state and central level intelligence sharing mechanisms to ensure the smooth flow of intelligence inputs among the states and between them and the center.
In 2009, the Indian government launched Operation Green Hunt, which deployed over 50,000 CPMF personnel in the worst Naxal affected regions. In 2005, the Salwa Judum emerged, a popular anti-Naxal movement led by the people of Chhattisgarh, and this was later adopted by the government, who has been funding and training Special Police Officers (SPO) under it ever since. This year, in addition to strengthening local police stations, the government has sanctioned 34 additional battalions of central forces and 16,000 additional SPOs to be deployed in these areas.
In terms of development, the Road Transport and Highways Ministry has sanctioned funds to improve road connectivity in the 34 worst affected districts, at a cost of US$9.5 million. The government is also investing heavily in the National Rural Health Mission, rural electrification, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (education for all), the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and the distribution of supplementary nutrition and forest rights at the central level. In a report by the Planning Commission in April 2010, government has approved a total of Rs 16,251.6 crore (US$162.5 billion) for development tasks in the Red Corridor. However, to implement these schemes, the government has to first come up with an anti-corruption strategy to ensure that the funds allocated reach their targets.
While the government is aiming at a comprehensive Naxal strategy, there are impediments in the form of resistance by the locals and systemic corruption within the local political establishment. Based on the recent trends, it is clear that the Naxalites are looking to intensify their activities. It is now up to the government to devise a unique counterstrategy based on the appeasement of socioeconomic concerns. This will be vital if India wants to put an end to this growing menace for good.
An analysis of the Naxal movement reveals a shift in their style of violence since November 2005, when about 1,000 Naxalites stormed the police lines around the Jehanabad district prison, Bihar, in a bid to free their jailed comrades. Called "Operation Jail Break", the action resulted in the escape of over 375 prisoners, including 130 Naxal cadres, and the death of eleven policemen in the ensuing gun battle. The precursor to this attack was the September 2004 merger of two militant Naxalite factions, the People‟s War Group (Communist Party of India – Marxist-Leninist) and the Maoist Communist Centre (India), to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist).
Following these developments, violence has escalated over large parts of India, and the trend in Naxal violence has changed. Kanu Sanyal, founding leader of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), admitted in 2007 that the Naxal movement has lost touch with its original motives, and deviated from its path to become a terrorist group. Most of the older generation of Naxalites abhor the large-scale violence that the Naxals are unleashing at present.
Originally, the main objective of Naxal violence was to seize power through an agrarian revolution, in order to then replace the existing feudal system through land reform. Now, however, their demands have deviated to encompass a general revolution and the overthrow of the existing political system and establish a parallel apparatus of governance. A severing of links with the Nepalese Maoists has accompanied this change. The Indian Maoists criticized the Nepalese Maoists, led by Prachanda, for ending the revolution and incarcerating their People‟s Liberation Army (PLA) in UN-supervised barracks, as part of their adoption of the parliamentary path. The criticism from the Indian Maoists intensified after Prachanda‟s 2009 victory in Nepal‟s general elections.
The Naxals have also shifted from being an agrarian revolution to expanding their reach to the far ends of the forested tribal corridor along the east-central heartland of India (the "Red Corridor"). This shift has resulted in the inclusion of tribal and forest rights in the Naxal agenda. Mining activities, the setting up of new industries and the building of infrastructure in these areas has resulted in the large-scale displacement of the local tribal populations. There have been no proper rehabilitation measures put in place by the government to accompany this development. This has created a trust deficit in the area and, finding that the Naxal cadres sympathize with their loss of homes and exploitation, the tribals have sided with them against the government. The Naxals are also using female cadres and young girls in their attacks. However, the Naxal leadership has yet to include any prominent females.
There has been a spurt in violence against security personnel, including state police and central paramilitary forces (CPMF). Naxals have started ambushing police parties in transit and looting their weapons. This is the Naxals‟ primary source of arms. In 2008, 45 security personnel were killed, in 2009 the number significantly increased to 312. So far, this year, the number stands at 227.
The government has substantially increased its deployment of security personnel in Naxal-affected areas, and this has probably contributed to the increase in casualties. Also, questions have been raised about the training and preparedness of security forces who, critics feel, are slack in following standard counter-insurgency operating procedures.
Of late, a pattern of coordinated simultaneous Naxal attacks on newly deployed security reinforcements has emerged. Police lines have come under attack concurrently with wider attacks against infrastructure. According to Central Reserve Police Forces (CRPF) estimates, there are between 10-15,000 armed Naxalites, in comparison to 60,000 security personnel, in the Red Corridor. However, guerrilla tactics of targeting and ambushing in hit-and-run operations are successfully employed by the Naxals.
In its embryonic stages, the Naxal movement was primarily village-based, and distanced from centers of government power. However, the Red Corridor has seen a significant expansion over the last few years, especially in the resource-rich eastern tribal parts of the country. This has led the Union government to take a more serious view of the situation, and precipitated an unprecedented level of connection between the government and rural and tribal areas.
The states most affected by Naxal violence, West Bengal, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra, account for about 85% of the total coal reserves of the country. There are also rich mineral reserves in almost all of these affected states. This has allowed the Naxals to wield influence over the country‟s economic growth prospects, thus escalating the Naxal problem to one of national significance.
Moreover, Naxal activities, which were earlier confined to rural and forested areas, are now being initiated in urban areas also. Top Naxal leaders, including Kobad Gandhy, who was arrested in New Delhi last year, have been making attempts to garner support and funds from urban laborers, students, human rights activists, social workers and sympathizers. This has led to an increase in public interest on the issue. In 2008, armed Naxals targeted two towns in Orissa. They have also warned of carrying out future coordinated urban attacks, but their capability to do so remains in doubt. Spurts of Naxal activity and efforts for garnering support in urban India are indicative of future problems.
When the Naxal movement started, axes and sickles were the primary weapons used to attack government machinery. In recent times, however the Naxals have started using sophisticated weapons technology along with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The use of IEDs in the Red Corridor has increased in the recent years by 50%. In addition, Naxal cadres are being given extensive weapons and explosive handling training. Some of the CDs recovered during anti-Naxal operations in Andhra Pradesh show a near military like training for the cadres.
The CPMF have limited capability to detect and disengage IEDs, and the Naxal cadres capitalize on this. The escalation of violence in these areas is partly a result of a sharp increase in the number of arms available to the Naxals. In 2009 the Naxals used rocket launchers, and are now reportedly in the process of developing remote controlled-IEDs, as opposed to their traditional manual ones. Security agencies and local police have indicated the presence of at least two factories making IEDs, small bombs and mortar shells by reusing gelatin sticks, which are sourced from mining areas in the dense forests along the foothills of Jharkhand and Chhatisgarh. The Naxals are also using Claymore Mines which don‟t need to be buried underground but can be fitted to a tree to cause intensive damage. There have been reports of Naxals using weapons smuggled from outside of the Red Corridor.
Unlike in the past when each state had its own anti-Naxal policy, the present trend indicates efforts to formulate a consolidated unitary strategy against the Naxal menace. This is evident in the recent move by the Federal Government to set up a unified anti-Naxal command for operations over the four worst affected Naxal states (Chhattisgarh, Orissa, West Bengal and Jharkhand). The government has also created state and central level intelligence sharing mechanisms to ensure the smooth flow of intelligence inputs among the states and between them and the center.
In 2009, the Indian government launched Operation Green Hunt, which deployed over 50,000 CPMF personnel in the worst Naxal affected regions. In 2005, the Salwa Judum emerged, a popular anti-Naxal movement led by the people of Chhattisgarh, and this was later adopted by the government, who has been funding and training Special Police Officers (SPO) under it ever since. This year, in addition to strengthening local police stations, the government has sanctioned 34 additional battalions of central forces and 16,000 additional SPOs to be deployed in these areas.
In terms of development, the Road Transport and Highways Ministry has sanctioned funds to improve road connectivity in the 34 worst affected districts, at a cost of US$9.5 million. The government is also investing heavily in the National Rural Health Mission, rural electrification, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (education for all), the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and the distribution of supplementary nutrition and forest rights at the central level. In a report by the Planning Commission in April 2010, government has approved a total of Rs 16,251.6 crore (US$162.5 billion) for development tasks in the Red Corridor. However, to implement these schemes, the government has to first come up with an anti-corruption strategy to ensure that the funds allocated reach their targets.
While the government is aiming at a comprehensive Naxal strategy, there are impediments in the form of resistance by the locals and systemic corruption within the local political establishment. Based on the recent trends, it is clear that the Naxalites are looking to intensify their activities. It is now up to the government to devise a unique counterstrategy based on the appeasement of socioeconomic concerns. This will be vital if India wants to put an end to this growing menace for good.
Sunday, November 21, 2010
Right Information by Right to Information: An Interview with Wajahat Habibullah
4 October 2010
As India grapples with the Naxal menace in Left Wing Extremism affected states with no concrete long-term solution in sight for now, the CIC suggests simple measures using the RTI which may prevent further outbreak of the problem.
Medha Chaturvedi: What is the genesis of RTI in terms of being utilized in Naxal affected areas in the Eastern Tribal Corridor?
Wajahat Habibullah: At the time when the Naxal u
prising first appeared in India in Naxalbari, another revolution was taking shape in Rajasthan, that of demand for Right to Information. In both places, the dispossessed excluded population was demanding the right to ask questions from the authority and equality and parity. However, one group took to arms, while the other pursued the RTI for the same demands.
MC: Can effective implementation of RTI reverse the trend of violence in the tribal hinterlands which are the worst affected by Left Wing Extremism?
WH: RTI can be an effective tool only as long as it is utilized before the violence starts. Once a trend of violence is set, it cannot be used to reverse the cycle. It is only a preventive and not a corrective measure. If used properly, it can be effective in the tribal heartlands of India, which are taken over by the Naxals at present.
MC: Has the failure of proper implementation of Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act, 1996 proved to be an element in increasing tribal anger towards the government?
WH: The tribals have been displaced, marginalized and victimized. It is critical to put PESA to proper use now. It has not been effectively utilized so far as it has not been able to bring much voice to the tribals. It must be given an opportunity and means to empower the tribals.
MC: Has the government been able to reach out to the vulnerable tribal population through the RTI?
WH: Government and administration have been oppressive since the British expropriated tribal and government areas. Now, with RTI, they have an opportunity to be heard. The tribals of India have suffered exploitation for far too long. Now, growth of education has allowed them to project what they have been denied. The redressal mechanism could include RTI as the initiating point. Unfortunately, so far the RTI has not been able to be properly implemented in the affected states.
MC: Which state has benefited the maximum from proper implementation of RTI? Which states show the worst implementation of the RTI?
WH: Except Andhra Pradesh, all Naxal affected states have the worst implementation record of RTI. This is the reason why Andhra Pradesh is now the state which is least affected by violence despite being the state where the genesis of the problem emerged with the Telangana uprising.
Andhra Pradesh has had very effective implementation of both Panchayati Raj and RTI. YS Rajasekhara Reddy was himself a big propagator of the RTI. He had said that the RTI Act was a big part of his success as it allowed him to reach out to the rural areas of the state and Telangana.
MC: RTI pendency has been steadily going up over the years. How far will it prove to be effective, even if implemented properly, in tribal areas when the pendency in areas with educated and aware problems is so high?
WH: RTI implementation position is much better. Statistically speaking, the pendency numbers have gone up - about three years ago, pending applications stood at 10,000. Now, they are 14,000. However, three years ago, total applications settled were 22,000; the number now stands at 65,000. So, in that context, while pendency has gone up, so has the number of people using the RTI.
MC: How can RTI result in a decline in violence?
WH: The expectation of people to get a reply for their grievances and making the system accountable has risen. This tendency will give way to a decline in overall violence. People may get agitated, frustrated or more demanding, but will not take to violence. It gives some sense of responsibility and accountability.
MC: How can the awareness about RTI spread in the interiors of Naxal affected areas where accessibility is still a huge problem for authorities?
WH: Spreading of awareness about RTI in tribal areas can be done through various NGOs working with the Naxals in the areas as they have better accessibility among the population rather than the authorities. Allow the civil society to function properly in these areas. Tribals are not even aware of the RTI as of now, let the NGOs and other agents of civil society spread the awareness about what can be done with the help of RTI as an alternate to taking up arms.
MC: Can RTI prove to be a tool for reforming the existing Naxal cadres?
WH: I don’t know if the RTI can prove to be an effective tool in reforming existing Naxal cadres. It can definitely be used to wean away their support base in the tribal belts. Right to Education, Whistleblowers’ Act etc, all go hand in hand.
MC: Has the media been playing a responsible role in the spreading of awareness about the RTI in Naxal areas? What else can they do?
WH: Visual media is playing a role in the spread of awareness about RTI. Doordarshan has given coverage in collaboration with the respective state governments to promote community television or education through community televisions and computerization through NREGA (already in place) by putting up computer systems in rural areas. Furthermore, the PDS system needs to be strengthened and visual media’s support can be sought for that.
MC: Can the corrupt practices in Indian politics and bureaucracy be reformed towards changing the pattern of uneducated vulnerable tribal population being targeted by the Naxals for support?
WH: Taken with RTE, if the RTI is promoted successfully in rural and tribal areas, it will help engender a demand for awareness. Political demand for the same will automatically follow if the masses demand for it. Effective utilization of RTI will also have a remedial effect on corruption in the Indian political and bureaucratic system; it will not eliminate it, but can be used for imposing restraint.
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/right-information-by-right-to-information-an-interview-with-wajahat-3252.html
As India grapples with the Naxal menace in Left Wing Extremism affected states with no concrete long-term solution in sight for now, the CIC suggests simple measures using the RTI which may prevent further outbreak of the problem.
Medha Chaturvedi: What is the genesis of RTI in terms of being utilized in Naxal affected areas in the Eastern Tribal Corridor?
Wajahat Habibullah: At the time when the Naxal u
prising first appeared in India in Naxalbari, another revolution was taking shape in Rajasthan, that of demand for Right to Information. In both places, the dispossessed excluded population was demanding the right to ask questions from the authority and equality and parity. However, one group took to arms, while the other pursued the RTI for the same demands.
MC: Can effective implementation of RTI reverse the trend of violence in the tribal hinterlands which are the worst affected by Left Wing Extremism?
WH: RTI can be an effective tool only as long as it is utilized before the violence starts. Once a trend of violence is set, it cannot be used to reverse the cycle. It is only a preventive and not a corrective measure. If used properly, it can be effective in the tribal heartlands of India, which are taken over by the Naxals at present.
MC: Has the failure of proper implementation of Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act, 1996 proved to be an element in increasing tribal anger towards the government?
WH: The tribals have been displaced, marginalized and victimized. It is critical to put PESA to proper use now. It has not been effectively utilized so far as it has not been able to bring much voice to the tribals. It must be given an opportunity and means to empower the tribals.
MC: Has the government been able to reach out to the vulnerable tribal population through the RTI?
WH: Government and administration have been oppressive since the British expropriated tribal and government areas. Now, with RTI, they have an opportunity to be heard. The tribals of India have suffered exploitation for far too long. Now, growth of education has allowed them to project what they have been denied. The redressal mechanism could include RTI as the initiating point. Unfortunately, so far the RTI has not been able to be properly implemented in the affected states.
MC: Which state has benefited the maximum from proper implementation of RTI? Which states show the worst implementation of the RTI?
WH: Except Andhra Pradesh, all Naxal affected states have the worst implementation record of RTI. This is the reason why Andhra Pradesh is now the state which is least affected by violence despite being the state where the genesis of the problem emerged with the Telangana uprising.
Andhra Pradesh has had very effective implementation of both Panchayati Raj and RTI. YS Rajasekhara Reddy was himself a big propagator of the RTI. He had said that the RTI Act was a big part of his success as it allowed him to reach out to the rural areas of the state and Telangana.
MC: RTI pendency has been steadily going up over the years. How far will it prove to be effective, even if implemented properly, in tribal areas when the pendency in areas with educated and aware problems is so high?
WH: RTI implementation position is much better. Statistically speaking, the pendency numbers have gone up - about three years ago, pending applications stood at 10,000. Now, they are 14,000. However, three years ago, total applications settled were 22,000; the number now stands at 65,000. So, in that context, while pendency has gone up, so has the number of people using the RTI.
MC: How can RTI result in a decline in violence?
WH: The expectation of people to get a reply for their grievances and making the system accountable has risen. This tendency will give way to a decline in overall violence. People may get agitated, frustrated or more demanding, but will not take to violence. It gives some sense of responsibility and accountability.
MC: How can the awareness about RTI spread in the interiors of Naxal affected areas where accessibility is still a huge problem for authorities?
WH: Spreading of awareness about RTI in tribal areas can be done through various NGOs working with the Naxals in the areas as they have better accessibility among the population rather than the authorities. Allow the civil society to function properly in these areas. Tribals are not even aware of the RTI as of now, let the NGOs and other agents of civil society spread the awareness about what can be done with the help of RTI as an alternate to taking up arms.
MC: Can RTI prove to be a tool for reforming the existing Naxal cadres?
WH: I don’t know if the RTI can prove to be an effective tool in reforming existing Naxal cadres. It can definitely be used to wean away their support base in the tribal belts. Right to Education, Whistleblowers’ Act etc, all go hand in hand.
MC: Has the media been playing a responsible role in the spreading of awareness about the RTI in Naxal areas? What else can they do?
WH: Visual media is playing a role in the spread of awareness about RTI. Doordarshan has given coverage in collaboration with the respective state governments to promote community television or education through community televisions and computerization through NREGA (already in place) by putting up computer systems in rural areas. Furthermore, the PDS system needs to be strengthened and visual media’s support can be sought for that.
MC: Can the corrupt practices in Indian politics and bureaucracy be reformed towards changing the pattern of uneducated vulnerable tribal population being targeted by the Naxals for support?
WH: Taken with RTE, if the RTI is promoted successfully in rural and tribal areas, it will help engender a demand for awareness. Political demand for the same will automatically follow if the masses demand for it. Effective utilization of RTI will also have a remedial effect on corruption in the Indian political and bureaucratic system; it will not eliminate it, but can be used for imposing restraint.
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/right-information-by-right-to-information-an-interview-with-wajahat-3252.html
Fighting the Naxalites: CRPF is not the Best Option
17 August 2010
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” – Sun Tzu in ‘The Art of War’
The problems of Naxal affected areas are well known and the government and security forces are criticized for their inaction. But, how do we correct these inadequacies? Can the government continue such a large scale operation for long without any policy correction? Is CPMF deployment the only solution and are they adequately equipped to solve the problem? With the above lines from the legendary Chinese author, it’s time to evaluate our preparedness to counter the Naxal menace.
The inadequacy of the CRPF that surfaced from the shocking Dantewada incident can be summarized as a lack of leadership, training, motivation and poor command and control. According to EN Rammohan, retired DG, BSF, who headed the enquiry committee on the incident, “CRPF is essentially a law and order force rather than for counter-insurgency operations. Even during their mandatory counter-insurgency training, their basic mindset is not appropriate. Moreover, leadership in CRPF is not praiseworthy. Unless troops and officers are trained and are in the thick of action together, the leadership will continue to suffer. As was evident in the Dantewada incident, the lack of able leadership led to flouting of the SOP causing death of 76 troops.” He added that the Naxals are targeting the CPMFs to seize their superior weapons. He suggests replacing CRPF deployment in Naxal areas by ITBP or BSF because of their capability in handling counter-insurgency operations.
However, there are questions about the efficacy of ITBP or BSF as the ideal force to be deployed in Naxal areas. Both, BSF and ITBP are apt essentially for securing the country’s borders. The problems faced in the red corridor are more socio-economic in genesis than terrorist-related. Notwithstanding this argument, keeping all your eggs in one basket is not a wise option. The security forces know the terrorists and their motivations, their highest concentrations and attack patterns, then why are they not able to prevent guerrilla attacks by the Naxals? Too much reliance on the CRPF in these areas has not shown any substantial progress so far. Perhaps it is time for the government to contemplate raising an exclusive dedicated force like the Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh.
There are reports that the government is seeking redeployment of forces as per operational plan offered by the states. There is also a talk of bringing in specialized forces for jungle warfare from the North East. Strong rumours about government employing psychologists to ensure sound mental health of the troops are also doing the rounds.
According to Kashmir Singh, Joint Secretary (Naxal Management), MHA, the CPMF are being targeted because that is the only source of weapons for Naxals. With regards to intelligence sharing, he dismissed the allegations on lack of coordination. “There is a State Multi-Agency Centre (SMAC) at state level which has inter-state intelligence sharing meetings daily and a central level Multi Agency Centre (MAC) which meets adequately,” he said.
In the 14 July Chief Minister’s Meeting with Prime Minister, Home Minister and Finance Minister, some solutions emerged. The Centre asked the worst affected –Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand and West Bengal to set up a Unified Command in the state capitals with Chief Secretaries as their heads. The other members will be the state DGP, the Development Commissioners, state Inspectors General (anti-Naxal operations) and CRPF, an Intelligence Bureau (IB) official and the state intelligence official along with a retired Major General rank army officer.
The Unified Commands will have powers and responsibilities over anti-Naxal operations by CPMF and the state police and will also chalk out the action plan for development initiatives once these forces dominate an area. The Unified Command will also have the powers to use and direct the helicopters allocated to each state for rescue operations and troop reinforcements. BSF air wing, which is operating the helicopters in these zones, will be supplemented with more Advance Light Helicopters and those from the Indian Air Force. The meeting also approved raising 34 new battalions of India Reserve Battalion (IRB) for these areas.
About 16,000 additional SPOs are sanctioned, taking the total number to about 30000. Strengthening of 400 police stations in the affected districts at US$20 million a police station over two years is also taken up along with the decision to improve road connectivity in 34 worst affected districts at a cost of US$9.5 by the Road Transport and Highways Ministry.
As Gen McArthur had said, “Provoke reaction to control action,” may be it’s time for the government to stop waiting for Naxals to strike again and take an initiative in taking them by surprise instead. While these proposed measures seem appealing, how much they translate into action, remains to be seen. For now, the outcome of the war on Naxalism seems distant, but hope lives on.
Part II of a two-part analysis on problems faced by the CPMF in Naxal affected areas
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/fighting-the-naxalites-crpf-is-not-the-best-option-3218.html
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” – Sun Tzu in ‘The Art of War’
The problems of Naxal affected areas are well known and the government and security forces are criticized for their inaction. But, how do we correct these inadequacies? Can the government continue such a large scale operation for long without any policy correction? Is CPMF deployment the only solution and are they adequately equipped to solve the problem? With the above lines from the legendary Chinese author, it’s time to evaluate our preparedness to counter the Naxal menace.
The inadequacy of the CRPF that surfaced from the shocking Dantewada incident can be summarized as a lack of leadership, training, motivation and poor command and control. According to EN Rammohan, retired DG, BSF, who headed the enquiry committee on the incident, “CRPF is essentially a law and order force rather than for counter-insurgency operations. Even during their mandatory counter-insurgency training, their basic mindset is not appropriate. Moreover, leadership in CRPF is not praiseworthy. Unless troops and officers are trained and are in the thick of action together, the leadership will continue to suffer. As was evident in the Dantewada incident, the lack of able leadership led to flouting of the SOP causing death of 76 troops.” He added that the Naxals are targeting the CPMFs to seize their superior weapons. He suggests replacing CRPF deployment in Naxal areas by ITBP or BSF because of their capability in handling counter-insurgency operations.
However, there are questions about the efficacy of ITBP or BSF as the ideal force to be deployed in Naxal areas. Both, BSF and ITBP are apt essentially for securing the country’s borders. The problems faced in the red corridor are more socio-economic in genesis than terrorist-related. Notwithstanding this argument, keeping all your eggs in one basket is not a wise option. The security forces know the terrorists and their motivations, their highest concentrations and attack patterns, then why are they not able to prevent guerrilla attacks by the Naxals? Too much reliance on the CRPF in these areas has not shown any substantial progress so far. Perhaps it is time for the government to contemplate raising an exclusive dedicated force like the Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh.
There are reports that the government is seeking redeployment of forces as per operational plan offered by the states. There is also a talk of bringing in specialized forces for jungle warfare from the North East. Strong rumours about government employing psychologists to ensure sound mental health of the troops are also doing the rounds.
According to Kashmir Singh, Joint Secretary (Naxal Management), MHA, the CPMF are being targeted because that is the only source of weapons for Naxals. With regards to intelligence sharing, he dismissed the allegations on lack of coordination. “There is a State Multi-Agency Centre (SMAC) at state level which has inter-state intelligence sharing meetings daily and a central level Multi Agency Centre (MAC) which meets adequately,” he said.
In the 14 July Chief Minister’s Meeting with Prime Minister, Home Minister and Finance Minister, some solutions emerged. The Centre asked the worst affected –Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand and West Bengal to set up a Unified Command in the state capitals with Chief Secretaries as their heads. The other members will be the state DGP, the Development Commissioners, state Inspectors General (anti-Naxal operations) and CRPF, an Intelligence Bureau (IB) official and the state intelligence official along with a retired Major General rank army officer.
The Unified Commands will have powers and responsibilities over anti-Naxal operations by CPMF and the state police and will also chalk out the action plan for development initiatives once these forces dominate an area. The Unified Command will also have the powers to use and direct the helicopters allocated to each state for rescue operations and troop reinforcements. BSF air wing, which is operating the helicopters in these zones, will be supplemented with more Advance Light Helicopters and those from the Indian Air Force. The meeting also approved raising 34 new battalions of India Reserve Battalion (IRB) for these areas.
About 16,000 additional SPOs are sanctioned, taking the total number to about 30000. Strengthening of 400 police stations in the affected districts at US$20 million a police station over two years is also taken up along with the decision to improve road connectivity in 34 worst affected districts at a cost of US$9.5 by the Road Transport and Highways Ministry.
As Gen McArthur had said, “Provoke reaction to control action,” may be it’s time for the government to stop waiting for Naxals to strike again and take an initiative in taking them by surprise instead. While these proposed measures seem appealing, how much they translate into action, remains to be seen. For now, the outcome of the war on Naxalism seems distant, but hope lives on.
Part II of a two-part analysis on problems faced by the CPMF in Naxal affected areas
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/fighting-the-naxalites-crpf-is-not-the-best-option-3218.html
Trying Times for the CPMFs in the Red Corridor
16 August 2010
The Indian security forces suffered 282 casualties in counter-insurgency operations so far this year, of which, 212 were in the Left Wing Extremism (LWE) affected states. Last year, this number was 312 out of total 431 casualties. In 2008 too, more than 57% of total security forces casualties in insurgency-related violence was reported from the LWE states. With attacks on the central paramilitary forces (CPMF), especially the CRPF, deployed in the troubled Naxal-affected regions getting alarmingly frequent, have the security forces become the target for Naxal attacks in the ‘Red Corridor’ of India? Is the government providing the forces adequate measures to ensure their own safety before they can safeguard the areas they are deployed in? Are the troops in these forward areas physically, mentally and logistically well-equipped to take on counter-insurgency operations in the tough terrains of LWE affected states?
On a fact-finding mission to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the CRPF headquarters, some gaping holes in the CPMF deployment emerged pertaining to the (absence of) adequate logistical support, psychological health and lack of adequate training to troops. While CRPF is keeping a brave front, the situation on ground speaks differently. “We are in those areas only to assist the State Police at places determined by them for Joint Operations,” said DG, CRPF, Vikram Srivastava. However, incidents like Dantewada and Narayanpur where respectively 76 and 26 CRPF men were ambushed and killed by the Naxals and their arms looted, highlight the need for a strategic change for CPMF deployment. So, is the problem with what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called “India’s biggest internal security challenge,” only in terms of coordination or beyond?
There are 60 CRPF battalions (60,000 troops) deployed in the red corridor as against 10-15 thousand armed Naxalites who have expertise in explosives like IEDs. Despite this ratio, the CRPF is facing many casualties. The problem is multi-dimensional. The CPMF are deployed in the worst affected areas with a deep forest cover. The Naxals know the terrain well and use it for safe hideouts and getaways after guerrilla attacks. Moreover, there aren’t adequate police stations, and the strength of police personnel in the existing ones is abysmal.
The problem becomes even more acute with lack of proper communication channels and roads. To sniff out an IED and mine from an unmetalled road is a difficult task extending an advantage to the Naxals. Interestingly, units deployed in these areas undergo a two month pre-induction training about the general topography of the area and ground situation, jungle warfare, and survival training. However, any training can be successful only if it is backed up with proper communication and logistics. Dispersed deployment of CPMF makes matters worse.
The problem of state-CPMF coordination became public in July when Chhattisgarh DGP, Vishwa Ranjan said, “We can’t teach the CRPF how to walk,” after the Centre called for "relocation and reconfiguration" of CPMF. Special DG (Naxal Operations) CRPF, Vijay Raman retaliated with an allegation of non-cooperation from state police. The state police and CRPF seem to have buried the hatchet for now, however, on ground, the problem of coordination persists.
Intelligence sharing among the affected states is another problem. Moreover, basic amenities and logistical support is lacking. Helicopters carrying supplies or in emergency evacuation and rescue operations have also been targeted in the past few months. The CPMF troops, living away from their families for long extended tenures, feel that they are being dealt an unfair hand. “Even in the Army, the Infantry corps troops are given one combat posting followed by a hard peace and a peace posting in rotation. We, on the other hand, find ourselves in combat postings for a long time,” said a CRPF official. On the contrary, The Naxals practice non-conventional warfare and their cadres are highly motivated with a strong information network.
The Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for any CPMF during counter-insurgency operations is clearly defined. Under coordinated deployment, before active participation in the operations, CPMFs need to conduct a recce of the area to familiarize themselves with the terrain. A road opening patrol (ROP) sanitizes the area before operations and conducts mine detection. Then, there is logistical intelligence gathering which is networked with other companies and bound-to-bound movement (safe area to safe area) is followed. For the night halt, parameter defence and patrolling is first put in place. In case a communication set is lost, it must be immediately reported and the frequencies changed. However, the recent attacks on CPMFs indicate that these SOPs aren’t being strictly followed. In the Dantewada incident, the CRPF company which was ambushed had initially lost one of their radio set and instead of reporting it, the next day, they went back to look for it and were taken by a surprise attack.
So, is the problem in deployment or is it with training or with both? Perhaps government needs to do more than just amending its offensive policy and lay emphasis on combating psychological and non-conventional warfare by keeping the forces motivated and ready for any surprise attacks.
A two-part analysis on problems faced by the CPMF in Naxal affected areas
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/trying-times-for-the-cpmfs-in-the-red-corridor-3215.html
The Indian security forces suffered 282 casualties in counter-insurgency operations so far this year, of which, 212 were in the Left Wing Extremism (LWE) affected states. Last year, this number was 312 out of total 431 casualties. In 2008 too, more than 57% of total security forces casualties in insurgency-related violence was reported from the LWE states. With attacks on the central paramilitary forces (CPMF), especially the CRPF, deployed in the troubled Naxal-affected regions getting alarmingly frequent, have the security forces become the target for Naxal attacks in the ‘Red Corridor’ of India? Is the government providing the forces adequate measures to ensure their own safety before they can safeguard the areas they are deployed in? Are the troops in these forward areas physically, mentally and logistically well-equipped to take on counter-insurgency operations in the tough terrains of LWE affected states?
On a fact-finding mission to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the CRPF headquarters, some gaping holes in the CPMF deployment emerged pertaining to the (absence of) adequate logistical support, psychological health and lack of adequate training to troops. While CRPF is keeping a brave front, the situation on ground speaks differently. “We are in those areas only to assist the State Police at places determined by them for Joint Operations,” said DG, CRPF, Vikram Srivastava. However, incidents like Dantewada and Narayanpur where respectively 76 and 26 CRPF men were ambushed and killed by the Naxals and their arms looted, highlight the need for a strategic change for CPMF deployment. So, is the problem with what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called “India’s biggest internal security challenge,” only in terms of coordination or beyond?
There are 60 CRPF battalions (60,000 troops) deployed in the red corridor as against 10-15 thousand armed Naxalites who have expertise in explosives like IEDs. Despite this ratio, the CRPF is facing many casualties. The problem is multi-dimensional. The CPMF are deployed in the worst affected areas with a deep forest cover. The Naxals know the terrain well and use it for safe hideouts and getaways after guerrilla attacks. Moreover, there aren’t adequate police stations, and the strength of police personnel in the existing ones is abysmal.
The problem becomes even more acute with lack of proper communication channels and roads. To sniff out an IED and mine from an unmetalled road is a difficult task extending an advantage to the Naxals. Interestingly, units deployed in these areas undergo a two month pre-induction training about the general topography of the area and ground situation, jungle warfare, and survival training. However, any training can be successful only if it is backed up with proper communication and logistics. Dispersed deployment of CPMF makes matters worse.
The problem of state-CPMF coordination became public in July when Chhattisgarh DGP, Vishwa Ranjan said, “We can’t teach the CRPF how to walk,” after the Centre called for "relocation and reconfiguration" of CPMF. Special DG (Naxal Operations) CRPF, Vijay Raman retaliated with an allegation of non-cooperation from state police. The state police and CRPF seem to have buried the hatchet for now, however, on ground, the problem of coordination persists.
Intelligence sharing among the affected states is another problem. Moreover, basic amenities and logistical support is lacking. Helicopters carrying supplies or in emergency evacuation and rescue operations have also been targeted in the past few months. The CPMF troops, living away from their families for long extended tenures, feel that they are being dealt an unfair hand. “Even in the Army, the Infantry corps troops are given one combat posting followed by a hard peace and a peace posting in rotation. We, on the other hand, find ourselves in combat postings for a long time,” said a CRPF official. On the contrary, The Naxals practice non-conventional warfare and their cadres are highly motivated with a strong information network.
The Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for any CPMF during counter-insurgency operations is clearly defined. Under coordinated deployment, before active participation in the operations, CPMFs need to conduct a recce of the area to familiarize themselves with the terrain. A road opening patrol (ROP) sanitizes the area before operations and conducts mine detection. Then, there is logistical intelligence gathering which is networked with other companies and bound-to-bound movement (safe area to safe area) is followed. For the night halt, parameter defence and patrolling is first put in place. In case a communication set is lost, it must be immediately reported and the frequencies changed. However, the recent attacks on CPMFs indicate that these SOPs aren’t being strictly followed. In the Dantewada incident, the CRPF company which was ambushed had initially lost one of their radio set and instead of reporting it, the next day, they went back to look for it and were taken by a surprise attack.
So, is the problem in deployment or is it with training or with both? Perhaps government needs to do more than just amending its offensive policy and lay emphasis on combating psychological and non-conventional warfare by keeping the forces motivated and ready for any surprise attacks.
A two-part analysis on problems faced by the CPMF in Naxal affected areas
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/trying-times-for-the-cpmfs-in-the-red-corridor-3215.html
India: Soft Hard or Sneaky
12 August 2010
There is no uniform ‘one-size-fits-all’ kind of a policy which can be applied to India. Therefore, the question about India being a hard or a soft state is a legitimate question. There are several critical questions on India’s stand on internal as well as external issues which are responsible for the tag of being a soft state, most of which primarily relate to issues of national security. Comparisons were drawn of India’s policies on these issues with the policies of other nations like Israel and China.
External Security
At present, India faces threats of infiltration and militancy from its immediate neighbours like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan while security threats from China also exist in a nuclear neighborhood. As a nation in the making, India does not have a well-defined policy of dealing with external aggression, and every insurgency is dealt with differently, as circumstances demand. The Indo-US nuclear deal can be seen as evidence to support the fact that India is not exactly a soft state. Managing a deal with the US which will benefit India in civil nuclear uses in the long run despite not being a signatory to either the CTBT or NPT is proof enough that India is firm where it needs to be. Perhaps, not having a uniform policy is India’s policy.
Views to the contrary included those that had India been tough in dealing with the Kashmir issue from the beginning; it would not have escalated to such enormous proportions. India’s decision to resume talks with Pakistan despite the overwhelming evidence against that nation in orchestrating the Mumbai 26/11 attacks in 2008 has shown its weak position. The same feeble stance was shown by India following the Kandahar hijacking in 1999 by the terrorist outfit, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, when India negotiated with the terrorists and released three of them, including Maulana Masood Azhar, who later formed the Jaish-e-Mohammad. In contrast, the Israeli policy of no-negotiation with hijackers and terrorists highlights that nation’s no-tolerance policy when it comes to dealing with terrorists.
However, soft strategies can be beneficial in maintaining peace and prosperity and India is recognized as a peaceful state. India has, for example, been very mindful about water-sharing issues with its neighbours by signing various water treaties. These ‘soft’ policies will not only benefit the state but also the region.
Internal Security
Every country has, as a priority, the need to ensure the security and safety of its citizens. India, sometimes, suffers a reverse effect in its approach to resolving internal disputes as they usually seem to escalate after government action, as seen in the case of military offensives against terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, the Northeast, and the violence related to Maoist extremism.
In such a scenario, negotiation and problem-solving becomes difficult, forcing the government to take ‘hard’ actions. Examples include the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act and more recently the creation of the Salwa Judum which can be seen as harsh, but innovative steps taken by India in countering internal conflict. The defence of democracy sometimes forces the state to take recourse to unsavoury and often extra-legal mechanisms.
The discussion held that in many instances, like militancy in Punjab and Mizoram, Indian strategy of wearing out and addressing the root cause, effectively worked, suggesting that perhaps India is a ‘sneaky hard state.’
However there were views stating India was a soft state for its weak-kneed approach to reacting to several terrorist acts over the years. It has failed in retaliating effectively against either its terrorist adversaries or their state sponsors. There have been instances when the state has been forced to release terrorists or criminals for hostages. However serious the situation, it cannot be denied that the government seems to buckle under threats, making it look like a soft state.
The state has also failed to meet security concerns at a micro level. Honour killings, displacement of people in the name of development policies and so on have resulted in an unstable atmosphere in certain parts of the country. Insensitivity to grassroots issues and tough stands on internal aggression deepen antagonism within the state. India continues to struggle to eradicate problems of feudalism and casteism – a struggle for which the Maoists have been able to take advantage of sections of India’s impoverished and tribal population.
Philosophy vs. Practicality
The question that arises is – has the Indian government done enough to mitigate the situation resulting in loss of face internally and externally? The answer was in the negative. The state’s response has been ‘inadequate,’ and it should be better prepared to meet terror threats in the future. For all practical purposes, it makes sense to address concerns and problems internally before lamenting over the ‘softness’ of the Indian state at a macro level. The softness comes not from lack of power, but from the lack of decision-making ability.
There were varying views on the issue of India’s preparedness for a full and final war as an answer to terrorism. While some readily agreed that this may perhaps be the only solution because the ‘avoid-confrontation policy’ of India has, so far, proved to be ineffective, especially in the context of Pakistan-related incidents of terrorism, some were of a different opinion. In case of a war, India has control only over its own actions. What if the other country decides to target civilians too? Would India be ready for such a situation?
Waging war could not be the solution. Taking ‘tough action’ in every minor matter might be dangerous, both externally and internally. Flexibility can sustain a country much longer in comparison to rigidity. India is different from other nations because it has to take into consideration the reality of a large and heterogeneous mix of cultures and peoples. In addition, the problem with war is not only political or logistical, but also ethical. How far can a state go with the ‘legitimate use of violence’? India’s philosophy of external relations has been one that emphasized the maintenance peace. India maintains that hatred breeds hatred, and therefore, war should be the last recourse.
Further, ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ are just tags and whether a state is one or the other is a matter of perception. India has a lot of historical, cultural and socioeconomic baggage which may prevent it from taking hard decisions on many issues. As opposed to some supposedly ‘hard’ nations, India’s diverse polity makes it difficult to take a uniform stand on several issues. Meanwhile, if the soft strategy benefits the state in the long-run, there is no harm in recognizing India as a soft state. That said, on economic and other issues like climate change, India has maintained a firm stance since the beginning. However, when it came to taking an unyielding view on dealing with aggression, India appears a soft state.
It is perhaps necessary to have a balance in Indian actions. What is essential is to resolve the conflict without disturbing the country’s democratic set-up and the world order. India needs to come up with an innovative strategy or model to address her security issues decisively. It is not important to debate whether India is a soft state or not. What matters is a long-term peace where citizens feel secure in their state.
To this internal reforms are the most important. The whole philosophy and structure of policing and intelligence need to undergo reevaluation and necessary changes must be brought about for a permanent solution for the wide array of internal conflicts. Firm steps to boost the administrative machinery to make it more accountable and transparent as well as stringent and rigorous towards aggression of any kind must be put in place, without which, India will continue to suffer at the hands of terrorism, both internally and externally.
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/india-soft-hard-or-sneaky-3212.html
There is no uniform ‘one-size-fits-all’ kind of a policy which can be applied to India. Therefore, the question about India being a hard or a soft state is a legitimate question. There are several critical questions on India’s stand on internal as well as external issues which are responsible for the tag of being a soft state, most of which primarily relate to issues of national security. Comparisons were drawn of India’s policies on these issues with the policies of other nations like Israel and China.
External Security
At present, India faces threats of infiltration and militancy from its immediate neighbours like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan while security threats from China also exist in a nuclear neighborhood. As a nation in the making, India does not have a well-defined policy of dealing with external aggression, and every insurgency is dealt with differently, as circumstances demand. The Indo-US nuclear deal can be seen as evidence to support the fact that India is not exactly a soft state. Managing a deal with the US which will benefit India in civil nuclear uses in the long run despite not being a signatory to either the CTBT or NPT is proof enough that India is firm where it needs to be. Perhaps, not having a uniform policy is India’s policy.
Views to the contrary included those that had India been tough in dealing with the Kashmir issue from the beginning; it would not have escalated to such enormous proportions. India’s decision to resume talks with Pakistan despite the overwhelming evidence against that nation in orchestrating the Mumbai 26/11 attacks in 2008 has shown its weak position. The same feeble stance was shown by India following the Kandahar hijacking in 1999 by the terrorist outfit, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, when India negotiated with the terrorists and released three of them, including Maulana Masood Azhar, who later formed the Jaish-e-Mohammad. In contrast, the Israeli policy of no-negotiation with hijackers and terrorists highlights that nation’s no-tolerance policy when it comes to dealing with terrorists.
However, soft strategies can be beneficial in maintaining peace and prosperity and India is recognized as a peaceful state. India has, for example, been very mindful about water-sharing issues with its neighbours by signing various water treaties. These ‘soft’ policies will not only benefit the state but also the region.
Internal Security
Every country has, as a priority, the need to ensure the security and safety of its citizens. India, sometimes, suffers a reverse effect in its approach to resolving internal disputes as they usually seem to escalate after government action, as seen in the case of military offensives against terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, the Northeast, and the violence related to Maoist extremism.
In such a scenario, negotiation and problem-solving becomes difficult, forcing the government to take ‘hard’ actions. Examples include the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act and more recently the creation of the Salwa Judum which can be seen as harsh, but innovative steps taken by India in countering internal conflict. The defence of democracy sometimes forces the state to take recourse to unsavoury and often extra-legal mechanisms.
The discussion held that in many instances, like militancy in Punjab and Mizoram, Indian strategy of wearing out and addressing the root cause, effectively worked, suggesting that perhaps India is a ‘sneaky hard state.’
However there were views stating India was a soft state for its weak-kneed approach to reacting to several terrorist acts over the years. It has failed in retaliating effectively against either its terrorist adversaries or their state sponsors. There have been instances when the state has been forced to release terrorists or criminals for hostages. However serious the situation, it cannot be denied that the government seems to buckle under threats, making it look like a soft state.
The state has also failed to meet security concerns at a micro level. Honour killings, displacement of people in the name of development policies and so on have resulted in an unstable atmosphere in certain parts of the country. Insensitivity to grassroots issues and tough stands on internal aggression deepen antagonism within the state. India continues to struggle to eradicate problems of feudalism and casteism – a struggle for which the Maoists have been able to take advantage of sections of India’s impoverished and tribal population.
Philosophy vs. Practicality
The question that arises is – has the Indian government done enough to mitigate the situation resulting in loss of face internally and externally? The answer was in the negative. The state’s response has been ‘inadequate,’ and it should be better prepared to meet terror threats in the future. For all practical purposes, it makes sense to address concerns and problems internally before lamenting over the ‘softness’ of the Indian state at a macro level. The softness comes not from lack of power, but from the lack of decision-making ability.
There were varying views on the issue of India’s preparedness for a full and final war as an answer to terrorism. While some readily agreed that this may perhaps be the only solution because the ‘avoid-confrontation policy’ of India has, so far, proved to be ineffective, especially in the context of Pakistan-related incidents of terrorism, some were of a different opinion. In case of a war, India has control only over its own actions. What if the other country decides to target civilians too? Would India be ready for such a situation?
Waging war could not be the solution. Taking ‘tough action’ in every minor matter might be dangerous, both externally and internally. Flexibility can sustain a country much longer in comparison to rigidity. India is different from other nations because it has to take into consideration the reality of a large and heterogeneous mix of cultures and peoples. In addition, the problem with war is not only political or logistical, but also ethical. How far can a state go with the ‘legitimate use of violence’? India’s philosophy of external relations has been one that emphasized the maintenance peace. India maintains that hatred breeds hatred, and therefore, war should be the last recourse.
Further, ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ are just tags and whether a state is one or the other is a matter of perception. India has a lot of historical, cultural and socioeconomic baggage which may prevent it from taking hard decisions on many issues. As opposed to some supposedly ‘hard’ nations, India’s diverse polity makes it difficult to take a uniform stand on several issues. Meanwhile, if the soft strategy benefits the state in the long-run, there is no harm in recognizing India as a soft state. That said, on economic and other issues like climate change, India has maintained a firm stance since the beginning. However, when it came to taking an unyielding view on dealing with aggression, India appears a soft state.
It is perhaps necessary to have a balance in Indian actions. What is essential is to resolve the conflict without disturbing the country’s democratic set-up and the world order. India needs to come up with an innovative strategy or model to address her security issues decisively. It is not important to debate whether India is a soft state or not. What matters is a long-term peace where citizens feel secure in their state.
To this internal reforms are the most important. The whole philosophy and structure of policing and intelligence need to undergo reevaluation and necessary changes must be brought about for a permanent solution for the wide array of internal conflicts. Firm steps to boost the administrative machinery to make it more accountable and transparent as well as stringent and rigorous towards aggression of any kind must be put in place, without which, India will continue to suffer at the hands of terrorism, both internally and externally.
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/india-soft-hard-or-sneaky-3212.html
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